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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY REPORT
Date: 13 June 2025
Subject: Security Threat Alert – Shipment of Hydrogen Peroxide from Egypt to Berbera Port, Somaliland

1. Executive Summary
This report alerts Israeli security institutions to a potentially sensitive and dangerous chemical shipment that recently arrived at the Port of Berbera in Somaliland. The consignment contains over 10 metric tons of Hydrogen Peroxide (UN2014, Class 5.1) — a dual-use chemical that can be employed in the manufacture of homemade explosives. Critically, the shipment originates from Egypt, a country that maintains tense strategic rivalry with Israel through its shifting regional alliances and indirect support to anti-Israeli proxies.
Recent intelligence suggests that the shipment is being smuggled onward to Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen — a group that has launched numerous missile and drone attacks against Israel in recent months. The Egyptian origin, combined with covert handling by a private actor in Somaliland, significantly increases the threat level.
2. Shipment Details
• Origin: Egyptian Ministry of Defence – Armament Authority
• Destination: MSG Group of Companies (Private) – Somaliland
• Clearing Agent: Qaalib Shipping Agency, Berbera
• Chemical: Hydrogen Peroxide – UN2014 (Oxidizer)
• Quantity: 400 drums (10,575 kg)
• Concentration: 70% (Highly concentrated industrial grade)
• Arrival Date: 24 November 2023
• Port of Entry: Berbera, Somaliland
3. Intelligence Insight: MSG Group of Companies
The MSG Group is owned by Mohamed Aw Siciid, a businessman previously flagged by regional intelligence for assisting Uyghur extremist networks. He is known to operate in gray zones between legitimate commerce and covert activities.
The shipment was falsely declared as "fertilizer," but in fact consists of 70% concentrated hydrogen peroxide — far above typical agricultural use and directly linked to the manufacture of explosives such as TATP and HMTD. This deceptive labeling strongly indicates concealment of illicit intent.
4. Regional Risk Factors for Israel
A. Dual-Use Chemical Threat
Hydrogen peroxide concentrations above 30% are easily weaponized. At 70%, this chemical is a potent precursor for explosives. Intelligence links similar shipments to:
• Houthi militias in Yemen
• Iranian proxy operations
• Transnational smuggling networks in the Horn of Africa
B. Lack of Regulatory Oversight
There is no evidence of:
• Licensing or inspection by Somaliland authorities
• MSG receiving government authorization for oxidizer handling
• Any export controls or end-user verification from Egypt
C. Unstable Regional Environment
• Berbera Port is a key logistical node with weak maritime and customs controls
• Arms and chemical trafficking routes have been documented between Berbera and Houthi-held ports in Yemen
• Ongoing instability in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea provides cover for smuggling
D. Geopolitical Implications
• The shipment came from the Egyptian military
• It is being handled by a private firm linked to unauthorized chemical trade
• The likely end-user is the Houthi insurgency, which poses a direct threat to Israeli national security
• There is a credible possibility of covert coordination or strategic destabilization involving Egypt, Iran, and anti-Israeli militias
5. Recommendations for Israeli Security Institutions
• Urgent Diplomatic Engagement with Somaliland
• Request documentation on the shipment's legal status and MSG’s authority to import military-grade chemicals
• Targeted Intelligence Surveillance
• Monitor MSG Group operations, its owner Mohamed Aw Siciid, and maritime movements from Berbera
• Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Maritime Security
• Deploy naval or drone surveillance to intercept suspect vessels en route to Yemen
• Regional Intelligence Coordination
• Work with partners in Djibouti, the UAE, and Western naval commands to track the movement of oxidizing agents
• Strategic Assessment of Egyptian Activities
• Investigate Egypt’s role in indirect material support to hostile actors targeting Israel
6. Conclusion
This is not a routine shipment. The origin (Egyptian military), concentration (70%), deceptive labeling, and suspected final destination (Houthi-controlled Yemen) mark this as a high-level regional security threat.
Immediate cross-border coordination, intelligence sharing, and strategic containment actions are recommended to prevent this chemical from being weaponized against Israeli targets.

Before you take any action based on the information I’ve provided, I want to show you a small piece of evidence — including the fact that Egypt’s Ministry of Defence is bringing in hydrogen peroxide with a concentration of 70%, which is used in the making of explosives.

👇 This is the Strategic Analysis of Iranian and Egyptian Networks Operating in the Red Sea andGulf of Aden (Report was compiled using Original  Security Briefing posted here  by Anonymous Source   

1. This comprehensive report details the covert and increasingly sophisticated operations of two distinct yet occasionally overlapping regional networks, one with clear links to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the other to the Arab Republic of Egypt. Both networks have established a significant, albeit clandestine, presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, with particular operational reach into Somaliland. These entities are engaged in a range of illicit activities, including the trafficking of arms, the import of dual-use chemicals, and intelligence-driven commercial ventures masquerading as legitimate businesses. The key facilitator for both networks, a powerful Djiboutian-Somalilander businessman named Mohamed Saed Guedi (MSG), has emerged as a central figure in enabling these destabilizing activities. The intricate web of front companies, unofficial diplomatic channels, and strategic exploitation of regional vulnerabilities poses a severe and evolving threat to maritime security, internal stability within the Horn of Africa, and international counter-terrorism efforts. This report will delve into the modus operandi, structure, notable activities, and the overarching threat posed by these networks, culminating in specific recommendations for enhanced monitoring and cooperative action.

2. Iranian Network Operations

2.1 Modus Operandi: The Maritime Veil

Iran’s deep-rooted presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and specifically its expansion into Somaliland, is meticulously disguised through a façade of legitimate commercial enterprises and fisheries-related activities. A primary component of this strategy involves the extensive use of Iranian fishing vessels, which are routinely observed in Somali waters, particularly off the coasts of Somaliland and Puntland. While outwardly engaged in fishing, intelligence consistently indicates that these vessels are repurposed for the covert transport of illicit arms and military supplies. These shipments are primarily intended for the Houthi movement in Yemen, a critical Iranian proxy in the regional power struggle.

The offloading process is highly coordinated and exploits the less-monitored, smaller ports along the Somaliland coast, such as Maydh and Laasqoray, in addition to strategic use of larger facilities like Berbera. At these pre-arranged landing points, a network of pre-positioned facilitators, often with significant local tribal or political links, takes custody of the illicit cargo. These facilitators are instrumental in managing the inland logistics, ensuring the swift and discreet movement of weapons and equipment to their intended recipients or onward transit points. The use of traditional dhows and small, agile boats for the final leg of maritime transport further complicates interdiction efforts, allowing shipments to blend seamlessly with legitimate local maritime traffic.

2.2 Structure and Representation: The Corporate Facade

The Iranian network is a complex amalgamation of Iranian state-linked officers, intelligence operatives, and strategically placed businessmen. These individuals operate primarily through a network of front companies established in key commercial centers like Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, and Berbera, its main port city. These companies are registered as legitimate import-export firms, dealing in a diverse range of commodities, including seafood, electronics, and industrial equipment. This seemingly innocuous commercial activity serves as a sophisticated cover for the movement of illicit shipments.

Coordination within the network, and between the Iranian state and its proxies, is facilitated through a combination of unofficial diplomatic channels and a web of proxy representatives. These proxies often leverage existing commercial relationships and local influence to secure necessary permits, access logistical resources, and circumvent scrutiny. The deep integration of these front companies within the local economy makes it challenging to differentiate between legitimate trade and covert operations, allowing the Iranian network to operate with a significant degree of impunity. Intelligence suggests that financial transactions are often layered through multiple accounts and jurisdictions, further obscuring the true nature of the funds and their ultimate beneficiaries.

2.3 Notable Activity: Weapons and Dual-Use Chemicals

Recent intelligence assessments highlight a disturbing trend in the nature of shipments facilitated by the Iranian network. Beyond conventional arms and military hardware, there is strong evidence of the transport of dual-use chemicals. Specifically, hydrogen peroxide has been identified as a recurring component in these illicit shipments. This chemical, while having legitimate industrial applications, is a known precursor for the manufacturing of improvised explosives (IEDs). The introduction of such materials into the volatile Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region significantly escalates the threat landscape, not only to maritime vessels but also to civilian populations and regional stability.

The timing of Iranian ship arrivals and subsequent offloading activities consistently coincides with the availability and movements of ground facilitators. This synchronized operation underscores the high degree of planning and coordination involved. The reliance on facilitators with established tribal or political links in Somaliland further enables the network to exploit pre-existing social structures and allegiances, providing an additional layer of protection and deniability. These patterns suggest a well-established and resilient supply chain designed to circumvent international sanctions and monitoring efforts, directly empowering the Houthi movement and contributing to regional destabilization.

3. Egyptian Network Operations

3.1 Strategic Objective: Countering Ethiopian Influence and Supporting Anti-Houthi Coalitions (Indirectly)

Egypt’s covert activities in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region are primarily driven by a complex set of geopolitical objectives, with a strong emphasis on countering Ethiopia’s expanding regional influence. The long-standing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the Nile water allocation remains a central point of contention, leading Cairo to seek strategic leverage wherever possible. Egypt’s approach in the region is multifaceted, aiming to undermine Ethiopian geopolitical aspirations, particularly in relation to its access to the Red Sea and its broader regional alliances.

Ironically, while Iran directly supports the Houthi movement, Egypt’s network also focuses on financially and logistically supporting various elements within the Yemeni conflict. This support is indirectly aimed at weakening Ethiopia’s regional alliances, as some of these alliances might be perceived as either tacitly or overtly supportive of the Houthis, or at least not actively opposing them. By supporting specific factions or providing financial aid that ultimately benefits those engaged in conflict, Egypt seeks to maintain a fragile balance of power, ensuring that no single regional actor gains overwhelming dominance, especially one that could further enhance Ethiopia’s strategic position. This approach creates a complex and sometimes paradoxical operational environment where both Iranian and Egyptian interests, despite their divergent ultimate goals, may utilize similar logistical channels to achieve their distinct objectives.

3.2 Operations in Somaliland: Financial and Logistical Influence

The Egyptian commercial presence in Somaliland is carefully orchestrated through a network of Somaliland-based businessmen and individuals who possess significant government affiliations or influence. This network leverages existing economic ties and creates new ones to serve its strategic objectives. A key component of this operational model involves the utilization of financial institutions. Locally registered branches of Egyptian-linked banks are employed to facilitate discreet fund transfers in support of Egypt’s regional agendas. These financial conduits are designed to mask the origin and ultimate destination of the funds, making it challenging to trace their illicit use.

Egypt-linked offices in Hargeisa operate under the guise of legitimate commercial ventures, primarily focusing on trade facilitation and construction support. However, intelligence indicates that their actual operations extend far beyond these stated objectives. These offices serve as critical nodes for intelligence gathering, logistical coordination, and the movement of strategic materials that contribute to influencing regional political dynamics. The commercial cover provides a seemingly innocuous facade, allowing Egyptian operatives to engage with local political and economic elites, gather intelligence on Ethiopia’s activities, and subtly exert influence within Somaliland’s political landscape. The involvement of government-affiliated individuals suggests a degree of complicity or at least turning a blind eye within certain local circles, further enabling the Egyptian network’s operations.

3.3 The Nexus: Mohamed Saed Guedi (MSG)

At the heart of both the Iranian and Egyptian covert networks in Somaliland lies the powerful Djiboutian-Somalilander businessman, Mohamed Saed Guedi (MSG). Intelligence reports highlight MSG as a pivotal figure, whose extensive commercial empire and deep-seated political connections are being exploited by both Tehran and Cairo to advance their respective, albeit differing, geopolitical interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Who is Mohamed Saed Guedi?

* Citizenship: While holding a Djiboutian passport, MSG maintains profound business and political ties to Somaliland, granting him significant operational flexibility across the Horn of Africa.

* Company Empire: MSG is the founder of the MSG Group, a sprawling conglomerate with diverse operations spanning fiber-optic internet infrastructure (including Somaliland’s main fiber internet cable), tobacco manufacturing, oil and gas exploration, energy distribution, shipping, logistics, and construction. His business footprint extends across the Horn of Africa, the UAE, and Kenya.

* Key Business Entities:

* SomCable: Introduced Somaliland’s main fiber internet cable infrastructure, providing MSG with critical control over communication channels.

* Business Royals: A tobacco company with factories in Dubai and Kenya, involved in the distribution of cigarettes to Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Iran. This extensive trade route is strongly suspected of facilitating the illicit transport of arms, dual-use chemicals, and funds.

* Independent Energy: Supplies energy solutions in Somaliland and is involved in oil and gas explorations in the UAE, providing another potential avenue for clandestine activities.

* EACS (Aramex franchise): Offers courier services, which could be exploited for covert deliveries.

Sources close to regional intelligence firmly suggest that MSG’s vast commercial empire functions as a sophisticated front for logistics and financial coordination between Iranian and Egyptian interests in the region. His ability to navigate complex regional political and economic landscapes, coupled with his legitimate business operations, provides an ideal cover for clandestine activities.

MSG’s Role in Iranian Activities:

* Shipping Disguised as Fishing: Iranian vessels, under the guise of fishing operations, are believed to utilize MSG’s logistical networks and influence to offload illicit cargo. This includes arms and dual-use chemicals (e.g., hydrogen peroxide) destined for Houthi militias in Yemen.

* Cover Companies: MSG-linked companies in Berbera and Hargeisa, operating in seafood and industrial equipment trade, are suspected of masking these illicit operations, providing legitimate invoices and paperwork for illegal shipments.

MSG’s Role in Egyptian Network’s Strategy:

* Political Influence: Egypt leverages MSG’s extensive business ties and influence to infiltrate local political circles in Somaliland. This is particularly crucial in Cairo’s efforts to counter Ethiopian influence, especially in the context of the Nile water dispute.

* Financial Channels: Egyptian-linked financial operations, allegedly supported and facilitated through MSG’s various enterprises and associated financial institutions, are used to discreetly funnel funds that support regional destabilization efforts and influence political outcomes.

The dual role of MSG in facilitating both Iranian and Egyptian networks highlights a dangerous convergence of interests, where a single, powerful civilian actor can effectively serve as a conduit for state-sponsored covert operations. His multi-passport status, regional mobility, and deep economic ties to rival powers position him as one of the most strategically dangerous non-state actors in East Africa today.

4. Threat Assessment

The presence and activities of the Iranian and Egyptian networks, particularly their convergence through figures like Mohamed Saed Guedi, represent a severe and multi-faceted threat to regional and international security.

| Threat Category | Iranian Network | Egyptian Network |

| Arms Trafficking | High – Direct and significant transfer of weapons and military supplies to the Houthi movement via Somaliland. This directly fuels the conflict in Yemen and enhances the capabilities of a designated terrorist organization. Recent reports indicate potential links and transfers of light weapons and technical expertise from Houthis to Al-Shabaab, further escalating regional instability. | Moderate – While not directly involved in large-scale arms shipments, the Egyptian network provides substantial financial and logistical support that indirectly enables various armed factions and anti-Houthi coalitions. This financial backing can facilitate the procurement of arms by these groups, albeit not through direct Egyptian military shipping. The goal is often to create regional leverage against Ethiopian interests. |

| Chemical Smuggling | High – Proven track record of smuggling dual-use chemicals, specifically hydrogen peroxide, which is a critical component for the manufacturing of improvised explosives (IEDs). This poses a direct threat to maritime vessels, infrastructure, and civilian populations in the region. The potential for these chemicals to fall into the hands of other terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab is a grave concern. | Low – No substantial evidence currently suggests direct involvement in the transport or smuggling of dual-use chemicals by the Egyptian network. Their focus remains primarily on financial and political influence rather than material transfers of this nature. |

| Political Infiltration | High – Effective utilization of tribal and business links within Somaliland to secure operational space and influence local decision-makers. This enables the network to circumvent official channels and operate with a high degree of stealth, potentially undermining the sovereignty and stability of local governance structures. The involvement of figures like MSG amplifies this threat. | High – Sophisticated use of economic influence, including through local businessmen and government-affiliated individuals, to penetrate and sway local political circles. This is aimed at countering rival regional powers, particularly Ethiopia, and securing strategic advantages for Egypt. This infiltration can create internal divisions and compromise governance. |

| Maritime Security | Severe – Extensive use of disguised armed vessels (fishing boats as cover) for illicit cargo transport poses a direct threat to maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These operations also bypass international inspection regimes and contribute to the proliferation of illicit weapons, exacerbating the risk of attacks on commercial shipping and naval assets. | Moderate – While the Egyptian network does not engage in direct military shipping of illicit goods, its financial and logistical support for regional actors can indirectly contribute to increased maritime instability by empowering groups that may engage in disruptive activities. The use of financial institutions for discreet transfers can also bypass anti-money laundering frameworks critical for maritime security efforts. |

| Intelligence Risks | Critical – The dual-use infrastructure and commercial covers utilized by networks facilitated by figures like MSG present significant counter-intelligence challenges. These operations could serve as platforms for surveillance, cyber-attacks, and the procurement of strategic materials that threaten allied interests, including those of the U.S., Israel, and Gulf partners. The intertwining of legitimate and illicit activities makes detection extremely difficult. | High – The covert financial channels and intelligence gathering activities of the Egyptian network pose significant risks to intelligence sharing and regional cooperation efforts. Their focus on undermining rival powers can lead to the spread of disinformation and the creation of internal fissures within allied structures. The potential for intelligence overlaps and compromises within the MSG nexus is also a major concern. |

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden remain critically vulnerable to multi-layered, state-backed covert operations. The intertwined Iranian and Egyptian networks, with Somaliland as a significant operational hub and Mohamed Saed Guedi as a central facilitator, pose profound and escalating risks to regional maritime security, internal stability within the Horn of Africa, and broader international counter-terrorism efforts. The flow of arms and dual-use chemicals directly fuels conflict and empowers dangerous non-state actors, while the political infiltration and financial manipulation undermine governance and foster instability.

Urgent Recommendations for Israeli and Allied Action:

* Enhanced Monitoring of MSG-linked Trade Routes: Prioritize the rigorous monitoring and intelligence gathering on all trade routes associated with Mohamed Saed Guedi and his MSG Group, with particular emphasis on cargo movements between Somaliland, Iran, Kenya, and the UAE. This includes tracking shipping manifests, financial transactions, and communication patterns.

* Joint Intelligence Cooperation: Strengthen intelligence-sharing and operational coordination with key regional and international partners, including the UAE, Kenya, Djibouti, and other interested parties. Establish a dedicated task force to specifically target the MSG nexus and its facilitating role in illicit activities.

* Stricter Port Inspections and Capacity Building: Implement and enforce significantly stricter inspection regimes at critical ports in Somaliland, particularly Berbera, Maydh, and Laasqoray. This requires investing in enhanced port security infrastructure, training local customs and security personnel, and deploying advanced detection technologies.

* Targeted Sanctions and Financial Disruption: Investigate and, where appropriate, implement targeted sanctions against individuals and entities (including MSG and components of his empire) demonstrably involved in facilitating these illicit networks. Work with international financial institutions to disrupt the financial channels used for illicit fund transfers.

* Public Diplomacy and Media Exposure: Elevate international awareness of the Iranian-Egyptian infiltration of Somaliland and the role of figures like MSG through proactive public diplomacy campaigns, investigative journalism, and reports from credible think tanks. This can help to de-legitimize covert operations and garner international support for counter-measures.

* Enhance Maritime Intelligence Assets: Increase the deployment and utilization of maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the Gulf of Aden and along the Berbera corridor to improve real-time tracking and interdiction capabilities.

* Support for Regional Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Provide targeted support and training to Somaliland’s security forces to enhance their capacity to counter illicit trafficking and address the growing threat of regional non-state actors linked to these networks.

Prepared:

Strategic Intelligence Unit

[Confidential Source]

End of Report